"There are three methods of market transactions: the first is to make guarantees and apply for credit; the second is to write gold and silver in the form of deeds; and the third is to trade and move goods."

The first article, "guaranteed credit application", is to lend money to credit borrowers who do not have property to pledge against.

"The law of market changes allows people to lend money on credit. If there is no resistance, the three of them will guarantee it and give it to them. They will all pay two-tenths of the interest. In addition to not losing interest if it expires, there will be a fine of two percent every month."

If you belong to a royal family, you don't need to pledge money. As long as "three or more people share the same insurance" and the identity certificate is issued by the chief minister, you can get a loan. The credit amount is "the amount of money with interest that cannot exceed two months."

Ordinary households have lower credit limits.

The second article, "The gold and silver of the deed shall be used as collateral" is the most important clause of the Market Change Law.

For pawn sales in the Song Dynasty, there must be a guarantor for the mortgage, so this method is also called the "guaranteed credit" method.

The objects for which the gold and silver of the deed were pledged were divided into three categories: one was the big businessmen who acted as officials doing business in the city; the other was people working in various businesses in Beijing; and the third was ordinary households.

The Municipal Yi Law stipulates that the municipal Yi affairs promotion officer is appointed by the imperial court, while the supervisory officer and the activity officer recruit big businessmen to serve as officials. The three of them "use real estate as offset and official loan money."

It is also stipulated that "it is allowed to call all the dental shops in Beijing to serve as the principals, and the dental professionals and experts will order Gongtong to own the property, or borrow gold and silver from other people's properties as collateral, and more than five people will act as guarantees."

Ordinary private households that are not engaged in business activities in the market are allowed to apply on credit "in proportion to the amount of material resources they can offset", and the credit amount cannot exceed the value of the offset.

The third article, trade and relocation of goods, means that the merchants are personally involved in buying and selling goods to make goods circulate and prices stabilize. The original intention is similar to the Changpingcang method to stabilize grain prices.

To put it bluntly, market trade is to first purchase goods from foreign merchants, and then lend the goods on credit to the big merchants in Beijing who contract the market trade. The big merchants subcontract to small businessmen, and the small businessmen repay the goods after selling the goods.

In addition to the handling fee, an additional 20% annual interest will be charged on the wasted money. If the payment is not repaid by the due date, an additional 2% penalty interest will be charged every month.

In fact, this is a kind of forced borrowing, coupled with the state's market monopoly, and the collusion between officials and businessmen to serve as both referees and players.

Wang Anshi appointed Lu Jiawen to report this matter. Lu Jiawen was a "family traitor" of the Lu family. Later, "History of the Song Dynasty" published separate biographies of him and Lu Gongbi, Lu Gongbi and other senior officials of the Lu family. It was absolutely impossible to gain political protection and support from the family. There was no trace of it.

Future, if you get this opportunity, of course you will repay it enthusiastically.

Lu Jiawen compiled the provisions of the Municipal Yi Law and submitted a letter. Among his suggestions was an important one: "The annexed family is more profitable, so the Municipal Yi Affairs Bureau is aware of it, and applies to the three divisions to implement the law."

Zhao Xu believed that this provision gave too much power to the Yisi, so he cut it off. Liu Xiaosun, the censor, said: "This shows how merciful and compassionate your majesty is to the people."

Anshi said: "The filial grandson praised this matter and thought it was a holy government, but the ministers foolishly said that this was a failure of the holy government."

This means that the cancellation of this article will leave the merger control system without constraints and will weaken the effect of the Market Change Law.

Because this method was launched under the pretext of profiting from the border markets of Shaanxi and making it convenient for officials, civilians, Han and Tibetan people, and Lu Jiawen was even more dissatisfied. He was not targeting Sitong Trading Company, so he was in trouble!

Therefore, Su You resolutely refused to take the blame and immediately wrote a chapter to express his strong opposition.

First of all, do all commodities have to be put into the market before they can be bought and sold? If there are no restrictions on the types of goods, and people borrow from the market and pay a handling fee first, and then pay two cents of interest after selling, then they

The annual profit must be at least 30%.

If it's okay for products with huge price differences, but if it's ordinary small commodities, can there be such high profits? Then after selling the things and paying off the loan, won't the common people lose money?

If this happens, how can market affairs be solved? The first is to lower the purchase price. Doesn’t this violate the original intention of protecting merchants coming to Beijing? The second is to increase the selling price. This is not going to make ordinary consumers in Bianjing suffer.

?

If the purpose of the imperial court is to protect commerce, inhibit mergers and promote circulation, it is actually very simple.

If the purpose is to break the monopoly of big businessmen and prevent foreign businessmen from suffering losses, the only way is to replace it with the government.

Let the guild deacons be institutionalized and diversified, introduce small and medium-level merchants to join them, allocate a quota for the number of households, vote collectively on major events, and pass by two-thirds, so that the guild is not a single voice for mergers and acquisitions, coupled with government supervision,

Isn’t it done?

For the goods of merchants entering Beijing, open bidding is implemented to break the entry barrier. Anyone can participate, and the price is left to the market. Isn’t it settled?

As for small households without capital and those without the ability to repay, they are targets of support, not production.

If you want support, don't charge interest, exclude them from official performance, and don't let the person who tortures them change from a big businessman to an official. That will make the disaster worse!

Always remember that sentence, loans are risky. If you want to make money from loans, you must first prevent risks.

If you want to earn interest, you must first be careful of losing your principal!

It’s not about forcing people to pawn their houses, but it’s about doing things up front and starting from the beginning, and never letting this happen!

Merchants are the same as farmers. Their capital is their land, their income is the food they grow, and their business taxes are their contribution to the country.

What the government should do is to cultivate more people who have land to plant, water to pour, and food to store, so that they can make contributions.

Otherwise, it will only lead to people having difficulty establishing a career and fleeing to become destitute. For businesses, it means that the number of people engaged in business will decrease, the market will be depressed, circulation will be poor, and then the workshops will be withered and prices will be high. The original intention and the result will be completely opposite!

Let’s talk about the current problems with this method:

First, the seasonal price difference of some commodities is not large. "It is difficult to regularize the increase or decrease in prices. However, the increase or decrease in prices in a state or a county must not be very far from each other, so the goods may be accumulated and difficult to sell."

After that, if you make less than 30% within a year, you are in danger of losing money. How to solve it?

Secondly, the government intervenes in the circulation of commodities as a lender, but there is a fixed ratio between market interest money and market regular money, so market officials must rely on "penalty interest" in order to expand their political achievements.

With the increase in penalty interest, will the Market Change Law become a loan shark that exploits the people?

Third, the penalty interest will inevitably lead to more and more principal and interest owed by merchants to Shiyi, which cannot be recovered, leading to the bankruptcy of private households with loans, making credit applications unsustainable. How to solve this problem?

Fourth, the power of the Municipal Yiwu is too heavy. The income generated by the Municipal Yiwu from the wholesale and retail of commodities does not belong to the national finance, but is controlled by the Municipal Yiwu officials.

This is actually to allow the city's business officials to be the first to use the city's business capital to "buy" goods at a low price from foreign merchants, and then wholesale and "sell them at a high price" to local merchants for retail.

In this process, the principal and interest of the credit loan that should have been borne by the city officials who "buy cheaply" were all passed on to the retail merchants.

In order to obtain the wholesale and retail price difference, expand the amount of credit, and pass on the principal and interest of the credit, the officials of the Municipal Yiwu will definitely force merchants to "buy from the Municipal Yiwu", making the Municipal Yiwu a market monopoly institution that "takes advantage of the government for mergers." How to avoid it

?How to deal with it?

Fifth, since the Municipal Bureau of Economic Affairs uses the amount of interest collected as the criterion for rewards and punishments, and in order to improve political performance, the Municipal Bureau of Industry and Trade is focused on collecting more interest, so how can we ensure that there will be no coercion or inducement of households to take out loans?

Sixth, market money is supposed to be lent to people doing business. In order to improve political performance, officials will inevitably charge more interest and extend non-commercial loans without distinguishing the target. This will inevitably evolve into pure usury. How to solve it?

Seventh, the goods borrowed from the City Yiwu may be "damaged" due to discrepancies in quality and price, or may not be sold because they are out of touch with market demand, or they may be "buying at a low price" because the City Yiwu officials raise the prices.

"Sell more expensive". If this happens, it will definitely cause losses to credit buyers. Is supervision necessary? How to avoid it?

Eighth, Zhongshu said that when the market changes, when the price is low, increase the price to buy, and when the price is high, sell at a low price. It is said that "it is cheap to buy, and it is expensive to sell", but in order to make a profit, will officials "not be cheap but be cheap?"

"It's cheap to buy, but it's expensive to sell"? How to avoid it? How to supervise it?

Ninth, will there be illegal operations by officials? For example, buying on credit from the market in the name of others; for example, letting people who did not buy on credit give their interest money in vain; for example, ordering traders not to go to other counties, which is often difficult; for example, manipulating prices
Chapter completed!